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THE SOUTH CENTRE
In August 1995, the South Centre became a permanent intergovernmental
organization of developing countries.  In pursuing its objectives of
promoting South solidarity, South-South co-operation, and coordinated
participation by developing countries in international forums, the South
Centre has full intellectual independence.  It prepares, publishes and
distributes information, strategic analyses and recommendations on
international economic, social and political matters of concern to the South.
The South Centre enjoys support and co-operation from the governments of
the countries of the South and is in regular working contact with the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Group of 77.  Its studies and position papers are
prepared by drawing on the technical and intellectual capacities existing
within South governments and institutions and among individuals of the
South.  Through working group sessions and wide consultations which
involve experts from different parts of the South, and sometimes from the
North, common problems of the South are studied and experience and
knowledge are shared.
PREFACE
The South Centre, with funding support from the UNDP’s TCDC Unit, has established
a project to monitor and analyse the work of WTO from the perspective of developing
countries. Recognizing the limited human and financial resources available to the
project, it focuses on selected issues in the WTO identified by a number of
developing countries as deserving priority attention. As hoped, the project has helped
in establishing a medium term work programme by the South Centre on issues related
to international trade and development. The work programme includes many sub-
projects on specific WTO Agreements/issues, under the South Centre work
programme Centre on issues related to international trade and development.
An important objective of the South Centre under programme on international
trade and development issues is to provide short and timely analytical inputs on
selected key issues under negotiations in the WTO. The publication of concise
analytical papers under the T.R.A.D.E. occasional paper series is an attempt to
achieve this objective. These occasional papers will provide brief analyses of chosen
topics to assist developing country negotiations but will not aim to offer exhaustive
treatment of each and every aspect of the issue.
It is hoped that the T.R.A.D.E. occasional paper series will be found useful by
developing country officials involved in WTO discussions and negotiations, in Geneva
as well as in the capitals.
The text of these occasional papers may be reproduced without prior
permission. However, clear indication of the South Centre's copyright is required.
 South Centre, October 2001
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
i. Three years after the OECD abandoned its controversial Multilateral Agreement
on Investment (MAI), a group of advanced countries, including the EU and
Japan are again attempting to establish a similar agreement, this time in the
WTO. From the submissions made by these countries at the WTO's Working
Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment, it would seem that
they would like an agreement which would provide investors with high
standards of investor protection as well as freedom to invest anywhere and in
any activity (subject to the usual exceptions for defence, culture etc.). One
important difference between the OECD's MAI and the advanced countries'
proposed new agreement in the WTO (referred to throughout this paper as
PMAI) is that the latter would exclude short-term capital flows and only be
concerned with FDI.
 
ii. This paper examines the implications of PMAI particularly from the standpoint of
developing countries.  It argues that (a) the case against an MAI-type
agreement is, if anything, stronger now than before; such a treaty would
seriously prejudice economic development;  (b) PMAI is not only incompatible
with the developmental needs of poor countries, it is also likely to harm the
interests of advanced country citizens and workers;  (c) a continuation of the
status quo in this area (i.e., implementing the bilateral investment treaties) would
be preferable for developing countries than the PMAI.  The reasoning behind the
propositions (a) to (c) above will be briefly presented in this Executive
Summary and more fully explained in the main body of the paper.
 
iii. FDI in the 1990s has become a predominant source of external finance for
developing countries. At the same time, these countries’ need for external
finance has, for structural reasons, become greater than before. This has led to
intense competition among them to attract FDI. As a consequence, the balance
of power in the dealings between developing countries and the multinationals
has shifted towards the latter. The paper suggests that an important
shortcoming of the PMAI from a developing country perspective is that instead
of redressing this imbalance such a treaty would make it worse.
 
iv. A detailed analysis of FDI as a source of long term finance for developing
countries indicates that unless it is adequately regulated by their governments,
in the particular circumstances of these countries, where they are subject to
frequent internal and external shocks, it would lead to short and long-term
financial fragility. To avoid this fragility, it is necessary for developing country
governments to control  (a) the timing of the FDI; (b) the total amount of FDI; as
well as  (c) the selection of large projects by multinationals. These measures
are needed to ensure that there is no mismatch of the time profile of a country's
foreign exchange inflows and outflows. Such time inconsistency can lead to a
liquidity crisis which, as the experience of Asian economic crisis shows, may
degenerate into solvency problems with ultimately devastating consequences
for the real economy.
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v. These arguments for enabling developing countries to monitor and to regulate
FDI flows are further complemented by considerations of technology transfer
and spill-over benefits. Research shows that both of those occur best when
FDI is carefully regulated and fits well into a host country's development
programme.
 
vi. Apart from individual developing countries’ need for policy autonomy in relation
to FDI regulation to forestall financial fragility and to promote economic
development, there are also serious reservations about PMAI from their
collective overall perspective. Specifically the current international distribution of
FDI inflows is unsatisfactory for economic development in poor countries.
Such inflows among these countries are largely concentrated in a small number
of relatively fast growing nations which already have high savings and
investment rates. More generally FDI does not go to low income and least
developed countries which have low savings rates and require FDI to meet their
developmental goals. It is argued here that the PMAI, by giving virtually
complete freedom to multinationals, would not improve the situation but, if
anything, would accentuate these difficulties.
 
vii. Increasingly, FDI in developing countries other than China is taking the form of
mergers and acquisitions (M & As). This raises further troubling questions for
developing countries in relation to PMAI. If FDI is occurring through take-overs,
would the PMAI require that an advanced country corporation should be able to
purchase any host country corporation, whether listed on the stock market or
not without any let or hindrance (subject to normal exceptions).  If so, such a
procedure is likely to have negative consequences both from a developing
country perspective as well as that of global economic efficiency. The paper
suggests that under PMAI, if FDI takes the form of acquisition of host country
corporations, the net result could be that of the best developing country
corporations being acquired by multinationals although the latter might not be as
efficient as the acquired corporations. Experience of advanced countries with
well developed markets for corporate control suggests that even in these
markets it is much more the large corporations which take over the small rather
than the less profitable being acquired by the more profitable.
 
viii. The recent gigantic international merger movement raises another area of
serious concern for developing countries in relation to PMAI. Already, the
playing fields are tilted against developing country corporations and favour the
large multinationals in a variety of ways. The present merger wave will further
accentuate the disparity in size and market power of the multinationals
compared even with the largest developing country corporations, let alone the
small and medium-sized firms.
 
ix. The mechanical application of the WTO principle of 'national treatment' in the
above circumstances would clearly lead to perverse results which would both
harm economic development in developing countries as well as lead to global
economic inefficiency.  The remedy in these circumstances may lie in
competition authorities in developing countries being exempted from the formal
or informal application of the  doctrine of national treatment, subject to a
safeguard clause such as a rule of reason in the context of promotion of
economic development, the latter being a primary goal of the WTO as
suggested below.
 
ix
 
 
x. The analysis and proposals presented in this paper run contrary to the
cherished WTO 'principles' such as national treatment and market access, as
well as seek to reopen agreements already settled such as on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMS).  The main justification for this perspective is
that the ultimate goals of WTO, as set out in its Preamble, include economic
development and full employment as very important objectives.  Experience
and analysis show, however, that these goals are being hindered rather than
helped by the TRIMS agreement and by the application of the doctrine of
national treatment in all cases.  It is argued here that, in a conflict between the
primary objectives and the procedural principles of an international organization,
it is the former which should dominate, especially as these goals are widely
endorsed by the world community as a whole.  The right to a decent living is
virtually a universal human right while "principles" such as national treatment
are no more than procedural rules which cannot have precedence over
economic development.
 
xi. It has been suggested above that unfettered FDI as envisaged in PMAI can
lead to financial fragility in developing countries and harm their development
prospects. However, what would be its implications for the citizens of advanced
countries?  There are good reasons to believe that, although there are gains to
the multinationals and their managers from PMAI as it would give them license
to invest anywhere they like, it does not necessarily greatly benefit the citizens
of advanced countries. With the free mobility of capital provided by PMAI, and
labour being essentially immobile, the balance of power shifts decisively
towards capital in these countries. Apart from its unfavourable implications for
the distribution of income between labour and capital, such a shift may also lead
to job insecurity and low labour standards.  It is, however, suggested here that,
with appropriate regulation of FDI by both developed and developing countries,
the results for the two groups of countries could be highly positive.  This would,
however, involve purposeful co-operation between the rich and poor countries,
rather an MAI.
 
xii. To attract FDI, developing countries have entered into a large number of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developed as well as other developing
countries, particularly in the 1990s.  These treaties are popular with developing
countries because they provide for national treatment to foreign investors in the
post-establishment phase only, and do not place any restrictions on host
countries in following their own FDI policies.
 
xiii. The advocates of PMAI make a number of arguments for replacing BITs by
multilateral treaties none of which is convincing. The paper notes, for example,
that there has been an enormous increase in FDI flows to developing countries
during the 1990s without there being a multilateral investment treaty in place.
Investors obviously regard BITs as adequate protection.  Moreover, countries
such as China and Malaysia, with comparatively illiberal investment regimes,
have been among the largest recipients of FDI during the last decade.
 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
A SOUTH PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
1. Three years ago when the OECD abandoned its controversial Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) in the wake of widespread opposition from the
civil society, developing countries, and ultimately from advanced countries such
as France, it was thought by many that the idea was dead1. However, it is being
energetically revived at the Working Group on the Relationship between Trade
and Investment at the WTO by advanced countries including the European
Union (EU), Japan and by the newcomer to the rich nations club namely, South
Korea. There are, however, no substantial new arguments being put forward by
the proponents of the 'born-again' MAI. Nevertheless some real, and some not
so real, concessions are being made in the direction of civil society and
towards developing countries. The real concession is that the proposed
agreement would apply only to foreign direct investment (FDI) and not include
portfolio investment and other short-term capital flows. The abandoned OECD
agreement had a comprehensive definition of investment and included the latter
together with FDI (see section II below).
 
2. The less tangible concessions are those made in the language used (much
more friendly) and the large measure of sympathy expressed for environmental
and developmental concerns of civil society and developing countries,
respectively. No specific proposals have, however, been put forward to
address these issues.  This briefing will argue:
a) Firstly, that the case against an MAI-type agreement is, if anything,
stronger now than before.  This is in part because of the Asian crisis but
is also due to other events in the world economy. Such a multilateral
accord would seriously prejudice economic development.
 
b) Secondly, that the proposed EU-supported agreement at the WTO
would not only act against the developmental needs of poor countries
but also most likely harm the long-term interests of citizens in developed
countries themselves. In other words, contrary to the assertions of its
                                                
1
 Developing countries had no part in the negotiations on the OECD MAI. The expectation was
that these countries would be asked to accede to its provisions after the agreement had been
established between the OECD member countries. This, of course, was not acceptable to
many developing countries and it also led to protests by myriad NGOs. Formally the effort to
establish an OECD MAI was abandoned after the United States and France withdrew their
support. See further Dhar and Chaturvedi (1998), Braunstein and Epstein (1999), Hoekman and
Saggi (1999), OECD (1997).
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sponsors, the proposed agreement, it will be suggested, would be sub-
optimal for both rich and poor countries.
c) Thirdly, a corollary of the above conclusions is that continuation of the
status quo in this area (that is, the implementation of Bilateral Investment
Treaties, BITs) will be preferable from a developing country perspective
than the proposed multilateral agreement.
II. PROPOSED MAI AND THE WTO
3. It would appear from the Papers and the so called Non-Papers circulated by the
EU, Japan and Korea at the WTO that these countries would like to conclude,
subject to the concessions noted above, a comprehensive investment
agreement essentially of the same kind which the OECD unsuccessfully
attempted to negotiate amongst its members in the second half of the 1990s.
The advanced countries' preference would seem to be to establish a binding
treaty at the WTO which would create for foreign investment a regime similar to
that of (free) trade in goods. Such a regime would basically give multinational
companies license to invest anywhere they like, without significant restrictions.
Although industrial countries have made no firm proposals at this stage, to the
extent that they choose to follow the OECD's MAI model, it would involve the
following kind of elements (as noted by Singh and Zammit, 1999):
· the right of establishment for foreign investors;
· the principles of 'most-favoured nation' (mfn) treatment;
· the principle of 'national treatment';
· investment protection, including matters relating to expropriation and the
transfer of capital;
· additional disciplines relating to, among other matters, entry, stay, and
work of key personnel;
· abolition of performance requirements imposed by host governments on
foreign investors in order to secure economic benefits for the country as
a whole;
· multilateral rules on investment incentives; and
· binding rules for settling disputes.
4. Thus, it would seem from the papers and discussions being carried out at the
WTO Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment that
the EU, Japan and Korea would like a regime with high standards of investor
protections and strong disciplines against restrictions on the free flow of FDI
activity, among WTO member countries. The Unites States agrees with the
need for a treaty with high standards, but is sceptical whether this is possible
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within the WTO. In view of the almost universal membership of the WTO and its
consensus rules of procedure, the US feels that it would only be possible to
negotiate there a multilateral agreement with low standards. Nevertheless, the
US does not oppose discussions and negotiations on the subject at the WTO, if
member countries wish to pursue these.
 
5. The original MAI was all embracing in its definition of investment. As the OECD
(1997) noted, the scope of the proposed Treaty went "beyond the traditional
notion of FDI to cover virtually all tangible and intangible assets which applies to
both pre-establishment and post-establishment". The abandoned OECD
agreement therefore included, among other things, intellectual property as well
as portfolio investment.
 
6. The present motivation of advanced countries for confining their proposed MAI-
type agreement at the WTO (hereafter referred to throughout this paper as
PMAI)2 to just foreign direct investment is not difficult to surmise. In the
aftermath of the Asian crisis, it has been widely recognised that the volatility of
short-term capital flows often leads to serious economic and financial problems
for developing countries. There is therefore an emerging consensus that it may
be prudent for the governments of these countries to restrict such flows.
Indeed, one of the world's leading advocates of free trade Professor Bhagwati
of Columbia University takes the IMF severely to task for encouraging
developing countries to liberalise their capital accounts before they were
adequately prepared for it. The IMF has in response changed its stance and is
willing to countenance leading emerging countries' use of capital controls for the
management of short-term capital flows. Moreover, although there is some
controversy as to how successful capital controls have been in Malaysia and
Chile, hardly anybody argues that these have done harm to these economies.
[See further Rodrik (2001); Krugmann (1998)].
 
7. Advanced countries are, therefore, wise to lower their sights and exclude short-
term and other controversial capital flows from the purview of the PMAI, and
seek agreement only on FDI. It is widely believed on the basis of the
experience of the debt crisis in the 1980s and the subsequent Mexican, Asian
and other crises in the 1990s that, compared with debt and portfolio investment,
FDI, apart from its other merits, is the safest source of funds for developing
countries. It is thought to neither add to a country's debt, nor (being bricks and
mortar) can it be quickly withdrawn from the country. The proponents therefore
expect that an MAI, concerned only with FDI, would be much more acceptable
to developing countries. This issue, however, is more complicated than might
appear at first sight, and will therefore be discussed more fully below.
 
8. Developing countries are a diverse and heterogeneous group in terms of their
economic conditions and needs, but a number of them are trying to find
common ground so as to be able to defend their developmental interests. In
relation to the proposed investment agreement their greatest difficulties are with
                                                
2
 To distinguish the OECD MAI from the similar agreement which advanced countries are
putting forward at the WTO, some commentators refer to the latter as MIA, Multilateral
Investment Agreement. However, as the advanced countries at the WTO have so far only
provided the broad framework of the kind of agreement they would like to have, it was thought
best to refer to it as PMAI, the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment in this paper.
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the questions of the right of establishment and national treatment, both pre and
post-establishment. As the following sections will show, there are very good
analytical reasons, as well as substantial empirical evidence, to support
developing countries' reservations.
III.  CHANGING PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS, FDI AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
9. There have been enormous changes in the amounts and the pattern of capital
flows from industrial countries to emerging economies in the 1980s and the
1990s compared with the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, there has also
been a sea-change in developing countries' perspective on, and attitude
towards, FDI.  In the earlier period, developing countries were often hostile
towards multinational investment and sought to control multinational companies'
activities through domestic and international regulations.  However, during the
last two decades emerging countries have been falling over themselves to
attract as much multinational investment as they can. It will be suggested below
that this enormous shift in developing countries’ stance toward multinational
investment is closely related to the changes in the pattern of capital flows.  The
former is both the cause and the consequence of the latter.  It will further be
argued that developing countries find the new profile of international capital
flows profoundly unsatisfactory from a developmental perspective. Their
opposition to PMAI stems in part from the fact that it would, instead of improving
this pattern of capital flows, further accentuate its negative features in relation to
economic development.
 
10. The rest of this section will summarise the main changes in the capital flows
from industrial to developing countries which have occurred in the 1980s and
the 1990s. It will also comment on the apparent paradox of developing countries
being positive about FDI and yet opposed to the PMAI.
A.  International Capital Flows in the 1980s and 1990s and Developing
Countries
11.  The most important characteristics of international capital flows to developing
countries during the last two decades include the following. (The relevant tables
are given in the Appendix.)
 
· There has been an enormous increase in financial resource flows to
developing countries during the last three decades as the world
economy has liberalised and become financially more integrated. World
Bank figures indicate that net resource flows to all developing countries
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rose from a mere US $11billions or so in 1970 to more than US $80b in
1980 and to just over US $100 billions in 1990.
 
· Net resources flows to developing countries recorded a quantum leap
between 1990 and 1995, rising to nearly US $240 billions in the latter
year. There was a further sharp increase in the next two years until the
Asian crisis. There have been reduced net resource flows subsequently
(Appendix Table 1).
 
· Appendix Table 1 also provides information on the changing sources of
the external resource flows to developing countries during the last three
decades. The table suggests that in the 1970s, long-term debt was the
predominant source of finance. In the 1980s, as a consequence of the
debt crisis, this source became relatively less important compared with
before and the significance of FDI, as well as that of government grants,
rose. In the 1990s FDI has emerged as a predominant source of
external finance for developing countries. Although the rate of growth of
portfolio equity flows was faster during that decade, these started at a
much lower level than FDI at the beginning of the 1990s.
 
· The IMF data reported in Table 2 in the Appendix enables us to
distinguish between private and official flows3. The important point which
emerges from this table is that most of the increase in capital flows to
developing countries in the 1990s has been due to private rather than
official flows. Between 1990 and 1996 private flows were on average
nearly 8 times as large as official flows.
 
· Appendix Table 3 reports data from the World Bank on developing
countries’ shares in global FDI, in capital market flows, and, for a
comparative perspective, it also reports these countries’ share in global
output and international trade for each of the years from 1991 to 2000.
The table indicates that developing country shares both in global FDI
and capital market flows have become much smaller since the Asian
crisis. However, these countries’ shares in global output and trade in the
corresponding period have not declined but remained much the same.
 
· Inward FDI flows accounted on average for 5% of advanced countries
gross fixed capital formation during the late 1980s and for most of the
1990s. However, there was a sharp increase in this share in 1998:
inward FDI's contribution in these countries rose from 6.2% in 1997 to
10.9 % in 1998. For developing countries inward FDI, during the 1990s
was relatively more important in relation to the gross fixed capital
formation than for developed countries (See Table 4 in Appendix).
 
· FDI flows to developing countries are highly concentrated. Ten countries
accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total FDI inflows in 2000
(World Bank 2001, page 38).
                                                
3
 The categories used and the countries included in the composite " developing countries" differ
between tables 1 and 2.
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B.  Implications for Developing Countries
12.  This pattern of capital flows, including that of FDI, has important substantive
implications for developing countries. The decline of grants and other official
flows has meant that private capital, particularly in the form of FDI, has become
a major source of external finance for these countries. At the same time,
analysis and evidence suggest that developing countries' need for external
finance has greatly increased. This is in part due to the liberalisation of trade
and capital flows in the international economy. UNCTAD (2000) suggests that,
because of these structural factors, developing countries have become more
balance-of-payments constrained than before: the constraint begins to bite at a
much slower growth rate than was the case previously in the 1970s and 1980s.
In these circumstances it is not surprising that developing countries have
radically changed their attitude towards FDI. There has also, therefore, been
intense competition among these countries for attracting FDI.
 
13.  Turning to the paradox of developing countries' favourable view of FDI and,
nevertheless, of their opposition to PMAI, it is important to observe that from the
perspective of developing countries the present pattern of external resource
flows is very unsatisfactory. As seen above, FDI flows are concentrated in a
few countries. These are normally countries, particularly the ones in East Asia,
which already have very high savings and investment rates. On the other hand,
low income and the least developed countries, which have small saving rates
because of their meagre levels of GDP per capita, do not get FDI or other
external resources that they need. Indeed, in broader terms, contrary to text
book neo-classical economics, world resources do not go from the rich to the
poor countries but instead are predominantly allocated to the rich countries,
including the richest among them, i.e., the US. Developing countries oppose
PMAI because it would do nothing to change this unsatisfactory pattern of
resource flows; instead it is likely to accentuate these negative features.
 
14.  Moreover, as observed above there has developed fierce competition between
developing countries for FDI and, as noted, there are good reasons for it. This
has however, resulted in a shift in the balance of power towards multinationals
in their dealings with developing countries. The latter fear, that if PMAI were to
be approved, it would instead of redressing this imbalance make it worse than
before.
IV.  PMAI, AND FDI AS A MAJOR SOURCE OF EXTERNAL FINANCE
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15.  As indicated above, an important characteristic of FDI today is that it has
become a prominent source of external finance for developing countries. Table
4 suggests that over the period 1996-1998 FDI accounted for about 10% of
typical developing country's gross fixed capital formation. In this section
(leaving aside other characteristics of FDI to be discussed later), we shall
consider it simply as a source of finance, and examine its implications for the
balance-of-payments and for macroeconomic management of the economy. In
orthodox analyses, FDI, apart from all the other supposed advantages, is
regarded as a stable source of finance (UNCTAD 1999; Lipsey 1999). In
contrast to portfolio investments, FDI by definition is supposed to reflect a long
term commitment as it involves normally a stake of 10% or more in a host
country enterprise, together with managerial control.4  In view of the latter
element, the presumption is that the inflow of foreign capital in this form will be
more stable than portfolio investments. The latter are easier to liquidate and
following an internal or external shock, investors may quickly withdraw such
funds from the host country.
 
16.  There are, however, important arguments to suggest that the presumption of
stability in net FDI inflows may not be correct. First, the distinction between FDI
and portfolio investment has become very much weaker with the growth of
derivatives and hedge funds. As Claessens et al., (1993) observe in their World
Bank study, even at a more elementary level it is easy to see how a long-term
"bricks and mortar" investment can be converted into a readily liquid asset:
 
"Because direct investors hold factories and other assets that are
impossible to move, it is sometimes assumed that a direct
investment inflow is more stable than other forms of capital flows.
This need not be the case. While a direct investor usually has
some immovable assets, there is no reason in principle why these
cannot be fully offset by domestic liabilities. Clearly a direct
investor can borrow in order to export capital, and thereby
generate rapid capital outflows."
 
 
17.  Another reason why FDI may be volatile is because a large part of a country's
measured FDI according to the IMF balance-of-payment conventions usually
consists of retained profits. As profits are affected by the business cycle, they
display considerable volatility. This also prevents FDI from being anti-cyclical
and stabilising unless the host and home country economic cycles are out of
phase with each other. That may or may not happen.
 
18.  Further, there is evidence that, like other sources of finance, FDI flows can also
at times come in surges. Apart from their contribution to volatility, these FDI
surges, as those for example of portfolio investment can lead to equally
undesirable consequences such as exchange rate appreciation and reduced
competitiveness of a country's tradable sector.
                                                
4
 This is the empirical definition of FDI adopted by many countries to distinguish it from portfolio
flows.
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19.  The World Bank paper referred to above came to the conclusion that: "long-
term flows are often as volatile as short- term flows, and the time it takes for an
unexpected shock to a flow to die out is similar across flows."5  However, a
more recent study (UNCTAD, 1998), found that between 1992 and 1997 FDI
was relatively more stable than portfolio flows, but there were important
exceptions.  The latter included Brazil, South Korea and Taiwan.
 
20.  Quite apart from the question of the comparative volatility of FDI and other
flows, there are other important implications of FDI for a host country's balance-
of-payments. These derive from the fact that an FDI investment creates foreign
exchange liabilities not only now but also into the future. This characteristic
leads to the danger that unfettered FDI may create a time profile of foreign
exchange outflows (in the form of dividend payments or profits repatriation) and
inflows (e.g., fresh FDI) which may be time inconsistent.  Experience shows
that such incompatibility, even in the short run, may easily produce a liquidity
crisis. The evidence from the Asian crisis countries with the latter suggests that
it could in turn degenerate into a solvency crisis with serious adverse
consequences for economic development.6 Professor Kregel (1996) sums up
the balance-of-payments implications of FDI in the following terms:
 
"…while portfolio flows may have a more direct impact on short-
term reserve management and exchange rate policy, FDI may
have both a short and a longer-term structural influence on the
composition of a country's external payment flows.  While financial
innovation allows FDI to have an impact in the short run which is
increasingly similar in terms of volatility to portfolio flows, the more
important aspect is the way it may mask the true position of a
country's balance-of-payments and the sustainability of any
particular combination of policies …  accumulated foreign claims in
the form of accumulated FDI stocks may create a potentially
disruptive force that can offset any domestic or external policy
goals."  (Kregel, 1996).
 
 
21.  These considerations suggest that, in order to avoid financial fragility which is
likely to follow from unfettered FDI, the governments would need to monitor and
regulate the amount and timing of FDI. Since the nature of large FDI projects
(whether or not for example these would produce exportable products or how
large their imports would be) can also significantly affect the time profile of
aggregate foreign exchange inflows and outflows, both in the short and long
term, the government may also need to regulate such investments.  To the
extent that the PMAI would not permit such regulation of FDI, it would subject
developing economies to much greater financial fragility than would otherwise
be the case.
 
22.  It could in principle be argued that, even if the financial fragility point is
conceded, a PMAI may still benefit developing countries by generating greater
overall FDI which could compensate for the increased financial fragility.
                                                
5
 Claessens et al  (1993), p26.
6
 See further Singh (1999a)
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However, this proposition is of doubtful validity. We saw earlier that there has
been a huge increase in FDI in the 1990s. This occurred without any MAI and
was clearly a product of a number of other factors.7 Similarly, there does not
seem to be any connection between regulatory constraints on FDI and the total
amount of FDI which a country may be able to attract. Malaysia and China, (see
Braunstein and Epstein, 1999), to illustrate, are large recipients of FDI despite
having significant control and regulation over FDI projects.
V.  FDI, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, SPILL-OVER AND PMAI
23.  Apart from FDI as a source of finance, two of the most important ways in which
a developing country may benefit from such investments is through (a) transfer
of technology and (b) from spill-overs.  The latter refer to the affect of FDI on
raising productivity in local firms.  These firms may be helped by foreign
investment in a variety of ways, including the demonstration effect of the new
technology and the enhancement of the quality of inputs which such investment
may promote.  On the other hand, there may be few positive or even negative
spill-overs, if FDI leads to local firms being forced out of the market because of
greater competition.
 
24.  Both issues of technology transfer and spill-overs have been widely studied
and there exists on these subjects a large and controversial literature. The main
lesson which comes from these writings, however, is that a country is more
likely to benefit from multinational investment if it is integrated into its national
development and technological plans (see further Dunning, 1994; Freeman,
1989; Milberg, 1999; South Centre, 2000; etc.) This is the reason why, other
than Hong Kong, most successful Asian countries (including China and
Malaysia as seen above), have not allowed unfettered FDI but have extensively
regulated it.
 
25.  An interesting recent study by Agosin and Mayer (2000) investigates an
important aspect of the spill-overs issue by asking the question whether FDI in
a host country "crowds in" further investment by local firms or "crowds out"
existing investments of these firms as a consequence of increased competition
and hence lower profits.  The two authors’ research covered the period 1970-
1996 and included host countries from all three developing regions, Africa, Asia
and Latin America.  The results of the econometric exercise suggest that over
this long period there was a strong "crowding in" in Asia, "crowding out" in Latin
America and more or less neutral effects in Africa.  Agosin and Mayer
conclude:
                                                
7
 This point is discussed further below.
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"The main conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that the
positive impacts of FDI on domestic investment are not assured.
In some cases, total investment may increase much less than FDI,
or may even fail to rise when a country experiences an increase in
FDI.  Therefore, the assumption that underpins policy toward FDI
in most developing countries - that FDI is always good for a
country's development and that a liberal policy toward MNEs is
sufficient to ensure positive effects - fails to be upheld by the data."
26.  They go on to note:
"…the most far-reaching liberalizations of FDI regimes in the 1990s
took place in Latin America, and that FDI regimes in Asia have
remained the least liberal in the developing world… Nonetheless, it
is in these countries that there is strongest evidence of CI
(crowding in).  In Latin America, on the other hand,…liberalization
does not appear to have led to CI."
 
 
27.  The policy implications of this analysis of FDI in relation to technology and spill-
overs reinforce the message of the last section: developing countries need to
regulate FDI closely in order for it to promote economic development and not to
hinder it.
A.  Market Failures
28.  In broad analytical terms, the case for such government interventions in the FDI
process lies in various kinds of market failures. Co-ordination problems abound
in relation to investment, including foreign investment, and in the presence of
non-existent or incomplete markets typical in a developing economy,
governments need to intervene to address co-ordination failures. As the
UNCTAD Secretary General R. Ricupero (1999) observed:
"Significant market failures characterise the TNC investment
process in its relationship to developing countries.  The first (kind
of market failures) arise from information or co-ordination failures in
the investment process, which can lead a country to attract
insufficient FDI, or the wrong quality of FDI. The second arises
when private interests of investors diverge from the economic
interests of host countries." (p.xxv, parenthesis added)
29.  Milberg (1999) calls attention to another kind of market failure in relation to FDI
which again calls for government intervention.  He observes:
"Location decisions of firms may deviate from those predicted by
comparative advantage for a number of reasons.  Firms may put
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national characteristics ahead of relative cost considerations.
Also, to the extent that heightened capital mobility has coincided
with growing global excess capacity, trade liberalization may not
bring the price adjustment necessary to convert a relative
productivity advantage to an advantage in terms of absolute money
costs.  When currency values do not respond to trade imbalances
in the expected fashion, then the price adjustment implied by the
theory of comparative advantage may also be inoperative."
B.  Government Failures
30.  It may be argued that these market failures may turn out to be less important
than government failures. That is certainly true in some cases, but it must be
remembered that the developing world also contains a large number of highly
successful governments, the so-called 'developmental states' in the newly
industrializing countries (NICs).  If developing countries are to attract the right
kind of FDI, in the right amounts, and to be able to obtain the maximum benefit
from these, they need to guide the process and therefore must have effective
states (see further Amsden, 2001).  For otherwise, they will not receive
sufficient FDI and may be more harmed than helped by what they get.
VI.  INTERNATIONAL  MERGER  MOVEMENT, FDI AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES8
31. The world economy has been undergoing a gigantic merger movement over the
last decade, probably the largest ever.9  An outstanding characteristic of this
merger wave is the high incidence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions
(M&As).  Indeed, such mergers and corporate take-overs are an important
vehicle for FDI flows between industrial countries.  However, cross-border
merger activity involving developing countries, although quite small by the
standards of advanced countries, has greatly expanded as well during the last
three years.  (See Table 5 in the Appendix for the sales and purchases of
cross-border M&As for the 1990s.)  The data in Table 5 are, however, at an
aggregate level - for the world as a whole and for the main regions. UNCTAD
(1999) carried out a more detailed analysis of the incidence of cross-border
M&As in developing countries.  It found that if China (which among developing
countries has not only been the largest recipient of FDI but most of its
investment has also been "green field", that is, new) is excluded, the share of
M&As in the accumulated FDI rises from 22% during 1988 to 1991 on average
to 72% in the period 1992 to 1997.
 
                                                
8
 This section is in part based on Singh and Dhumale (1999).
9
 For previous merger waves in the U.S. and U.K., see Golbe and White (1998); Hughes and
Singh (1980).
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32. This preferred mode of entry of FDI raises troubling questions in relation to its
costs and benefits for developing countries.  It also raises difficult questions for
PMAI.  When FDI takes the form of green field investment, it represents a net
addition to the host country's capital stock.  However, FDI entry via an
acquisition may not represent any addition at all to the capital stock, output or
employment.  In the medium term there may be more investment by the
acquiring firm if the acquisition is deemed successful.  How beneficial FDI is to
developing countries in the long term, if it takes predominantly the form of
cross-border take-overs of domestic firms by foreign corporations, is ultimately
an empirical question on which there is so far little hard evidence.
 
33. Nevertheless, cross-border take-overs raise difficult issues for PMAI.  If FDI is
occurring through take-overs, would the PMAI require that an advanced country
corporation should be able to purchase any host country corporation on the
stock market without let or hindrance, (except in relation to firms protected by
national defence or other similar considerations)?  This important issue does
not appear to have been directly addressed in PMAI.  However, going by the
analogy with the green field investment where essentially the PMAI would
permit any home country corporation to invest in any activity in a host country
(subject to the usual caveats), it would follow that a foreign company should be
able to acquire any domestic company as a form of FDI.  From a developing
country perspective such a procedure would have very negative
consequences.  There is a large literature which suggests that corporate take-
overs take place only to a limited extent on the basis of performance, but largely
on the basis of size.  Research for the U.S. and the U.K. shows that, in the
market for corporate control, the large, relatively unprofitable companies have a
much greater chance of survival than the small, profitable ones.10  Thus, under
PMAI, if FDI takes the form of acquisition of host country corporations on the
stock market, the net result could be that of the best developing country
corporations being acquired by the much larger multinationals even though the
latter would not be as efficient as the acquired corporations.
 
34. The international merger movement raises another important area of concern
for developing countries.  This relates to the question of unequal competition
between large multinationals and big domestic corporations in these countries.
Even the largest developing country corporations tend to be much smaller than
the industrial country multinationals.  The current large merger wave is likely to
make this disparity even bigger.  By means of these world-wide mergers and
tie-ups, the advanced country corporations are able to integrate their
international operations.  This may be a source of genuine technical economies
of scale, but evidence indicates that in most industries average cost curves are
L-shaped, that is to say, after a threshold size which is relatively small and
which most of these giant corporations would already have achieved even
before mergers, costs do not fall as the size of the firm increases.  The
economies which nevertheless the multinationals are able to achieve through
integration are those relating to bulk buying of inputs, reduced cost of capital
                                                
10
 See Singh (1971, 1975); Schwarz (1982); Cosh , Hughes, Lee and Singh (1989).  For a review
of this literature see Singh (1992); Hughes (1994). Singh (1998) suggests that such failures in
the market for corporate control are likely to be more serious in emerging stock markets than
those of advanced economies. If a developing country does not have a stock market there are
even stronger reasons to expect market imperfection and market failure.
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due to large size, as well as economies achieved in advertising and other
marketing activities on a large scale.  To the extent that these economies
depend on the market power of the multinationals in relation to inputs, the cost
saving measures are not necessarily welfare enhancing; furthermore, these
"pecuniary economies" create barriers to entry which makes the markets less
contestable.11
 
35. During the last 50 years, Japan, as well as many NICs in Asia and Latin
America, were able to foster the development of big businesses to the
advantage of these countries' overall economic development.  This has usually
been achieved through various kinds of state support.  These large domestic
corporations, which are privately owned, have often been the leaders in the
diffusion of new technologies and the adaptation of imported technologies to
domestic circumstances.12  However, in the current international economic
environment these firms are likely to be handicapped in three significant ways:
a) through the limiting of state aid as part of WTO disciplines;
b) through the increased size and market power both in the product and
input markets of large multinationals; and
c) through increased barriers to entry and contestability which the merger
boom is creating.
36. It is normal for multinationals to complain that there is no 'level playing field'
between themselves and national corporations which are government
supported; hence, the multinationals' demand for "national treatment".
However, the actual situation is quite the opposite; the playing fields are tilted in
favour of multinationals who have considerable market power. The current
international merger movements is making these fields more unequal even from
the perspective of the large developing country corporations.
 
37. The mechanical application of the sacred WTO principle of 'national treatment'
in the circumstances set out above would clearly lead to perverse results which
would both harm economic development in developing countries as well as lead
to global economic inefficiency.  The remedy in these circumstances may lie in
competition authorities in developing countries being exempted from the formal
or informal application of the doctrine of national treatment, subject to a
safeguard clause such as a rule of reason in the context of promotion of
economic development, the latter being regarded as a primary goal of the WTO.
(On the last point, see the following section.)
 
38. To provide a simple illustration, it should be perfectly legitimate for a developing
country competition authority to allow large domestic firms to merge so that they
can go some way toward competing on more equal terms with multinationals
from abroad.  Even if the amalgamating national firms are on the horizontal part
of the L-shaped static cost curve, bigger size may still promote dynamic
efficiency for the reason that firms need to achieve a minimum threshold size to
finance their own R & D activities.  The competition authority may therefore
                                                
11
 For a comprehensive discussion of the economies of scale and of scope, and of multiplant
economies of scale, see Scherer and Ross (1990).
12
 See further Amsden, (1989) and Singh (1995a)
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quite reasonable deny national treatment to the multinationals and prohibit their
merger activity (because they are already large enough to achieve either static
or dynamic economies of scale in this sense).  In these circumstances, a
violation of the doctrine of national treatment is likely to be beneficial both to
economic development and to competition.
VII. THE RIGHT TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PMAI
 
 
 
39. It may be argued against the analysis and proposals outlined above that these
run contrary to the cherished WTO 'principles' such as national treatment and
market access, as well as attempt to reopen agreements already settled such
as the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS).  This is
certainly one side of the ledger.  There is, however, the other side which
unfortunately is completely ignored by the proponents of PMAI.  This concerns
the ultimate goals of the WTO and their relationship to that organisation's
procedural principles such as national treatment.
 
40. The Preamble to the WTO notes that "trade and economic endeavour should be
conducted with a view to raising the standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand".  It is further stated that "there is need for positive efforts
designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the least-
developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development".  Full
employment and economic development are not only the ultimate goals of the
WTO but these have also been repeatedly endorsed by the international
community.  In 1995, 117 Heads of State or Government attending the
Copenhagen Social Summit endorsed the Copenhagen Declaration, which put
primary emphasis on the promotion of full employment and poverty reduction.
More recently similar declaration have been made at the Millennium Summit at
the UN and other fora. Indeed, the right to a decent living has virtually acquired
the status of a universal human right.
 
41. If experience and analysis show that the primary goals of  WTO are being
harmed rather than helped by specific measures such as TRIMS, or the equal
application to all countries of a particular procedural principle such as national
treatment, it is the latter which should be changed.  It is the primary goals rather
than the procedural principles of an international organization which should
dominate especially as the former are widely endorsed by the world community
as a whole.
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VIII. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
42.  To attract FDI, developing countries have entered into a large number of
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with developed as well as other developing
countries.  Ganesan (1998) reports that by January 1997 there were 1,330
such treaties in over 162 countries.  This compares with less than 400 at the
beginning of the 1990s.  Ganesan notes that these treaties were popular with
developing countries because they provided for "national treatment to foreign
investors in the post-establishment phase only, and do not place any
restrictions on host countries in following their own FDI policies.  This is
because the aim of BITs is the protection and equitable treatment of FDI after
the investment has taken place in consonance with the host countries' laws and
regulations."
 
43.  The advocates of PMAI make a number of arguments for replacing BITs by
multilateral treaties which it may be useful to examine.  The first is a
transactions costs argument which suggests that everybody would gain from
the lower transaction costs involved in a multilateral agreement.  This
suggestion is essentially one of bureaucratic neatness and centralisation, and
is not convincing.  As Hoekman and Saggi (1999) note in their World Bank
paper:
 
"Regarding the costs imposed by the multitude of BITs on
multinational firms, it seems that the major proportion of the
transactions costs associated with FDI is likely to arise from
differences in language, culture, politics, and the general
business climate of a host country.  Familiarising oneself with
the investment laws of a country seems trivial in contrast to
these more daunting challenges that exist regardless of whether
the country is a signatory to a multilateral or a bilateral
investment agreement."
 
 
44.  The second, in some ways related argument made by PMAI enthusiasts, is to
suggest that a multilateral agreement would provide a more secure framework
for multinationals and thereby lead to greater FDI than now.  This argument has
already been briefly examined earlier although in a different context, but that
analysis remains relevant.  As was noted, there has been an enormous
increase in FDI in the 1990s which has evidently occurred under the regime of
BITs.  Investments protection is normally provided in these treaties by
provisions for private international arbitration.  Evidence suggests, however,
that this has seldom been resorted to with the parties usually settling their
disputes prior to arbitration.  A central point is that investment protection for
investors is also essentially guaranteed by the fact that there is enormous
competition between developing countries for FDI and no country would wish to
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acquire a poor reputation with investors.  There is nothing to suggest that a
multilateral agreement would provide more protection which would translate into
more overall FDI.  The main determinants of FDI, a wide range of research
suggests, are the level of a country's per capita income, its rate of growth, and
its physical and human capital infrastructure.13  As noted earlier, countries such
as China and Malaysia have been able to attract enormous amounts of FDI
despite their comparatively illiberal investment regimes.  The protection to
investors provided by the BITs as well as the reputational concerns of
developing countries has  clearly been regarded as adequate.
 
45.  One argument in favour of multilateralism which has more validity is that of
unequal power between advanced countries and some very poor developing
countries which may lead the latter to having to agree to onerous terms in their
BITs.  The suggestion is that such countries would gain from a multilateral
treaty where they would collectively have more influence. This, however,
presupposes that a multilateral treaty on investment which is finally negotiated
would be development friendly.  If it is not, and there can not be any assurance
that such a treaty would necessarily emerge from the WTO process, the poor
developing countries would be better off with the BITs notwithstanding their
shortcomings, than with a multilateral treaty of the PMAI kind.
IX. CONCLUSION
46.  The main points of this paper have been presented in the Executive Summary.
Very briefly, the central conclusion which follows from the analysis of this paper
is that PMAI, despite its important concession of confining itself to only one
source of external finance namely FDI, is a flawed proposal both from the
perspective of developing and developed countries.  Its shortcomings are
particularly serious with respect to developing countries as it essentially ignores
the developmental dimension altogether. Developing countries would be better
off with their existing bilateral treaties (BITs) than with a multilateral agreement
of the kind represented by PMAI.
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 See further Burke and Epstein (2000); Milberg (1999) among others.
APPENDIX
TABLE I
NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 1970 TO 1998.
(US$ bill ions)
1970 1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998
Net flow of long-term debt (excl. IMF)1 6.9 65.2 43.4 77.0 87.6 118.7 82.9
Foreign direct investment (net) 2.2 4.4 24.5 95.5 119.0 163.4 155.0
Portfolio equity f lows 0.0 0.0 3.7 32.1 45.8 30.2 14.1
Grants (excl. technical cooperation) 2.2 13.2 29.2 32.6 29.2 25.7 23.0
Total net resource flows 11.3 82.8 100.8 237.2 281.6 338.0 275.0
1
 Bank loans, bonds, of f ic ia l  (bi lateral  and mult i lateral)  loans.
Source:  World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1999; data for 1995 is f rom Global Development
Finance, 1997; and 1996 is f rom Global Development Finance, 1998.
TABLE 2
NET PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL CAPITAL FLOWS:
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1984–1989, 1990–1996
(US $ bill ions, annual averages)
1984–1989 1990–1996
Net private capital f lows1 17.8 129.4
  Net direct investment 12.2 57.9
  Net portfolio investment 4.9 51.1
  Other net investment 0.6 20.4
Net off icial f lows 27.2 16.8
Change in reserves2 5.1 –54.8
1
 Because of data l imitat ions, “other net investment” may include some off ic ial  f lows.
2
 A minus sign indicates an increase.
Source:  IMF, World Economic Outlook, 1998.
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TABLE 3
DEVELOPING COUNTRY FLOWS OF FDI, CAPITAL MARKET FLOWS,
OUTPUT AND TRADE AS PERCENTAGES OF GLOBAL TOTALS, 1991-2000.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
In global capital market
flows
9.7 9.4 9.4 9.0 9.0 9.8 10.8 6.2 4.7 5.5
In global FDI flows 22.3 27.4 29.5 35.2 32.3 34.9 36.5 25.9 18.9 15.9
In global output 19.8 19.2 19.7 20.0 20.7 22.1 23.2 21.6 21.7 22.5
In global trade 26.5 28.3 28.3 28.4 29.5 31.3 32.4 30.7 30.7 33.4
Source: World Bank 2001, table 2.3 page 37, adapted.
TABLE 4
INWARD FDI FLOWS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION
DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 1988-1998.
(Percentage)
Developed countries Developing countries
1988-1993
(Annual Average)
4.0 4.6
1994 3.5 8.3
1995 4.5 7.6
1996 4.8 9.1
1997 6.2 10.8
1998 10.9 11.5
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions and Development (2000),
Annex table B.5. Page 306, adapted.
page 19
TABLE 5
CROSS-BORDER M&AS: SALES AND PURCHASES,
BY REGION, 1990-1999
(Billions of dollars)
Sales Purchases
Region/ economy 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999 1990 1995 1997 1998 1999
Developed
countries
134.2 164.6 234.7 445.1 644.6 143.2 173.7 272.0 511.4 677.3
of which:
European Union 62.1 75.1 114.6 187.9 344.5 86.5 81.4 142.1 284.4 497.7
United States 54.7 53.2 81.7 209.5 233.0 27.6 57.3 80.9 137.4 112.4
Japan 0.1 0.5 3.1 4.0 15.9 14.0 3.9 2.7 1.3 9.8
Developing
Countries
16.1 15.9 64.3 80.7 63.4 7.0 12.8 32.4 19.2 41.2
of which:
Africa 0.5 0.2 1.7 0.7 0.6 - 0.1 - 0.2 0.4
Latin America and
the Caribbean
11.5 8.6 41.1 63.9 37.2 1.6 4.0 10.7 12.6 24.9
Europe - - - - 0.3 - - - - -
Asia 4.1 6.9 21.3 16.1 25.3 5.4 8.8 21.7 6.4 15.9
Pacific - 0.1 0.3 - 0.1 - - - - -
Central and
Eastern Europea
0.3 6.0 5.8 5.1 10.3 - 0.1 0.3 1.0 1.6
Worldb 150.6 186.6 304.8 531.6 720.1 150.6 186.6 304.8 531.6 720.1
a
 includes the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
b
 includes amounts that cannot be allocated by region.
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2000.
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